Corey Maltbia

5. The Respondent, Police Officer Corey V. Maltbia, Star No. 7516, charged herein, is guilty of violating Rule 1 and Rule 2 in that the Superintendent proved by a preponderance of the evidence the following charges:
On or about August 18, 2016, at approximately 12:40 a.m., in the vicinity of 10604 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Officer Maltbia was the driver of a Chevrolet Tahoe sports utility vehicle that was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a Lincoln Town Car resulting in damage to a vehicle driven or attended by another person, Officer Maltbia knew said accident had occurred, and Officer Maltbia failed to immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident and/or failed to stop as close thereto as possible and to immediately return to and remain at the scene of said accident until he had performed his duty to give information and render aid. Officer Maltbia thereby violated:

a. Rule 1, which prohibits violation of any law or ordinance, by violating Section 11-402(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-402(a) (West 2016)); and

b. Rule 2, which prohibits any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.

See the findings set forth in paragraph no. 4 above, which are incorporated here by reference. The Illinois Appellate Court has held that if a person driving a vehicle knows that he was in an accident, he has a duty to stay at the scene to exchange information and render aid, even if he or she does not know that he or she caused damage. People v Hileman, 185 Ill.App.3d 510, 515 (5th Dist. 1989). Failure to do so violates 625 ILCS 5/11-402(a), commonly known as the “hit and run statute.” Id. Here, by his own admission, Officer Maltbia knew he was in an accident with Mr. Phillips. There is also no dispute that Officer Maltbia left the scene at 10604 South Michigan Avenue without providing his information or seeking to render aid. While Officer Maltbia claims he was under stress from lack of sleep, a recent divorce, and his father’s illness, this does not excuse the violation of this important statutory obligation, particularly for a police officer. In addition, the Board does not believe Officer Maltbia’s claim that he hit his head and that this injury caused him to leave, as there is no evidence he sought medical attention for a head injury and he does not explain why bumping his head would excuse his failure to comply with the statute. Where, as here, a police officer violates the law, he impairs the discipline and efficiency of the Department, and thereby impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals and brings discredit upon the Department. See, Kappel v Police Board of Chicago, 220 Ill.App.3d 580, 591 (1st Dist. 1991). As such, Officer Maltbia is guilty of violating both Rule 1 and Rule 2.

6. The Respondent, Police Officer Corey V. Maltbia, Star No. 7516, charged herein, is guilty of violating Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 6, and Rule 14 in that the Superintendent proved by a preponderance of the evidence the following charges:
On or about August 18, 2016, at approximately 7:00 a.m., at the Chicago Police Department’s 6th District Station located at or near 7808 South Halsted Street, Chicago, Officer Maltbia generated Illinois Traffic Crash Report HZ-397075, some or all of the contents of which, including but not limited to the accident location and/or event narrative, he knew to be false. Officer Maltbia thereby violated:

a. Rule1, which prohibits violation of any law or ordinance, by violating Section 11-409 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-409 (West 2016)), which prohibits providing information in an oral or written report required by the Illinois Vehicle Code with knowledge or reason to believe that such information is false;

b. Rule 2, which prohibits any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department;

c. Rule 6, which prohibits disobedience or an order or directive, whether written or oral,when he disobeyed Chicago Police Department General Order G09-01-02, Section II(A)(8) (effective September 11, 1998), which prohibits knowingly entering any false data into any Departmental record, file, or report; and

d. Rule 14, which prohibits making a false report, written or oral.

See the findings set forth in paragraph nos. 4 and 5 above, which are incorporated here by reference. Officer Maltbia plainly filed a false Traffic Crash Report at the Sixth District police station, when he said his car was damaged while parked in front of his house. He knew that, in fact, he had been in an accident near 10604 South Michigan Avenue the night before. He admitted this. Virtually everything in this report is false, including where the accident happened, how it happened, when it happened, and where Officer Maltbia was when the accident occurred. Nor did Officer Maltbia make any effort to file a supplemental Traffic Crash Report to correct his original report. The Board finds that Officer Maltbia’s statements were willfully false and material. The suggestion that stress in an officer’s personal life excuses his responsibility to be truthful in his police reports has no merit. Officers are often faced with stressful situations both on the street and at home, but that stress cannot undermine the officer’s fundamental obligation to be truthful in what he or she writes in official reports. The credibility of the Department depends on truthful reports. Nor does the Board believe that the head injury Officer Maltbia claims to have suffered, which is uncorroborated by medical treatment records and did not interfere with his trip to Las Vegas the next day, excuses his false report. The report was also clearly material, in that it falsely recounted critical facts so as to excuse Officer Maltbia from any fault in the accident, and further was then not only filed with the State of Illinois, but also used by Officer Maltbia to obtain a settlement with his insurance company.1

Footnote: 1 The Board notes that the “willful and material” standard applies only to Rule 14 violations, and not necessarily to the Rule 1, 2, and 6 violations alleged here. However, because the Board has found that the statements in Officer Maltbia’s Traffic Crash Report here were willfully false and material, it has no occasion to explore the standard of proof necessary to establish when a false report violates Rules 1, 2 and 6. A willful and material false statement clearly violates Rules 1, 2, 6, and 14.